Please note the forthcoming Semester 1 CLAB Events listed below; all welcome!
22 November – 12.00 – 13.00 – Williamson 4.07:
Alican Caliskan (Kadir Has University / Visiting Researcher at UoM)
Assignability of Receivables under Turkish and English Law: Requirements and Prohibitions
Chaired by Orkun Akseli
Abstract: The assignment of receivables is a critical mechanism for facilitating access to finance. Different rules in various legal systems determine how freely receivables can be assigned, influencing the accessibility and fluidity of financial resources.
This seminar will examine the assignability of receivables in Turkish and English law, focusing on the comparative legal frameworks that define and influence the assignability. It will explore which types of receivables are transferable in each legal system, alongside the broader implications for financing through assignment. The analysis will cover the range of assignable receivables and the legal and contractual conditions that affect their transfer, including statutory limitations and notable contrasts between Turkish and English practices.
The seminar aims to identify the flexibility of each legal system in facilitating the assignment of receivables, with particular attention to individuals and SMEs facing credit access challenges. In this context, the discussion will assess the potential of assignment as a tool to enhance access to credit by understanding the underlying conditions and restrictions in Turkish and English law.
27 November – 16.00-17.00 – Williamson 4.07
Derek Whayman (University of Reading)
Incomplete Agency and the Re-Evaluation of the Applicability of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
Abstract: Agency has performed a vital role in the world of commerce for centuries. The simple idea that one person may act on behalf of another has proven enduring and expedient. Conventional ‘complete agency’ is convenient in that the client does not have to re-engage with the ultimate provider of the product or service. It allows the agent to bind the principal to a contract automatically. But modern e-commerce has diminished the need for complete agency. A client does not need to laboriously fill in and sign a new form after being recommended a product or service if desirous of it. He or she merely needs to click or tap and will be referred automatically to the provider with all the details filled in and need only confirm. This is ‘incomplete agency’, a term gaining currency in recent texts. It is thus high time to examine the distinctions and commonalities between complete and incomplete agency more closely and reexamine the nature of the duties owned.
The most significant issue, attracting much recent judicial attention, is whether the fiduciary duty of loyalty is owed. After all, the agency problem attaches to both types on account of an agent’s advisory function and thus a similar response is warranted. The law of incomplete agency is developing rapidly in area. Determining if the duty is owed is a multifactorial enquiry drawing in the requirements of special vulnerability, market practice, the economic function of the engagement and degree of influence. The recent cases have concerned estate agents and loan and other financial product brokers. The English courts have been in the vanguard, but we have seen engagement with these matters in Singapore, Canada and Australia too.
Given the general movement from status to contract in this and other fields, it is likely that this multifactorial approach will spread to complete agency, and even complete agents will cease to owe fiduciary duties merely on the basis of falling into their category. Instead, the precise nature of the engagement will determine the duties owed and indeed any permitted exceptions. That this method has already made inroads into the category approach – particularly concerning duty-duty conflicts – supports the argument it is becoming predominant when analysing duty-interest conflicts.
Moreover, the different content of the non-fiduciary duties of complete and incomplete agents is also examined. The baseline is that incomplete agents plainly owe fewer obligations than complete agents. Equally plainly both may commit actionable errors of negligence in the course of their engagements. Determining the precise differences not only gives better definition to each kind of agency, but also feeds back into the multifactorial question of whether the fiduciary duty of loyalty is owed and to what extent.
4 December – 14.00-15.30 – Roscoe 1.010
Vincenzo Bavoso – The Quest for Access to Finance: Between the (Broken) Promises of FinTech Lending and the (Hopeful) Tradition of Susu
A presentation on systems of access to finance that are alternative to banks, namely at FinTech-based peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms and traditional Susu schemes.